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ABSTRACT
The inflammatory and elitist language Nietzsche uses in Beyond Good and Evil to describe the
relationship between the ruling class and the underclass is often read as hyperbolic, and attempts
are often made in the secondary literature to spare him the appearance of advocating gratuitous
exploitation. This thesis challenges the assumption that Nietzsche is speaking hyperbolically in
the passages in question. It argues in fact that the descriptive project Nietzsche undertakes in
Beyond Good and Evil requires the prima facie radical exploitation it puts forward. The central
aim of the thesis is to situate his description of human exploitation within the broader framework
of a perfectionistic account the conditions of human advancement.
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INTRODUCTION

In the opening line from Part IX of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche offers the following
insight regarding certain preconditions for human perfection. “Every enhancement of the type
‘man’ has so far been the work of an aristocratic society – and it will be so again and again – a
society that believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between man
and man, and that needs slavery in some sense or other” (BGE 257). In the very next section
Nietzsche expands on what he intends here by “slavery” with the exhortation there that the
subjugated be treated as less than fully human:
The essential characteristic of a good and healthy aristocracy, however, is
that it experiences itself not as a function (whether of the monarchy or the
commonwealth) but as their meaning and highest justification – that it
therefore accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human
beings who, for its sake must be reduced and lowered to incomplete human
beings, to slaves, to instruments. (BGE 258)
There is a reading of the exploitation painted in these passages that suggests Nietzsche is
describing something less radical here than first meets the eye. This reading would have it that,
in the context of the flourishing society Nietzsche envisions, servitude constitutes its own form
of thriving and is consequently in the best interest of the enslaved. What is more, this reading
proposes that the greatest meaning and fulfillment such individuals are capable of attaining in
life necessitates their servitude.
I will take issue with this characterization of the exploitation Nietzsche describes in BGE.
My thesis will be that [1] the human flourishing Nietzsche envisions in this text requires the
prima facie radical exploitation referenced above, and that [2] to characterize it as ultimately
benign to the fortunes of those who suffer it would be to moralize the consummate immoralist
and to give his supra-moral description of the conditions of human perfection a moral tone he
would have rejected.
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Roughly speaking, I will divide the paper into two main sections. In the first of them I
will examine two related but distinct interpretations of the texts referenced above, one advanced
by Andrew Huddleston, the other by Jeffrey Church. Contra my own reading, these interpreters
take Nietzsche to suppose that when modern cultures thrive in the sense to be described, their
flourishing ultimately redounds to the benefit of everyone, including those they exploit. In order
to support this claim, both commentators widen conceptions of key terms like ‘exploitation’ and
‘slavery.’ I will explain in what sense expanding these concepts putatively serves to underwrite
claims that Nietzsche sees the subjugation of the modern underclass by the elite as less radical
than it he makes it seem. Finally, I will attempt to contrast their respective accounts regarding
these particulars before going on to discuss the overall inconsistencies of both positions with
Nietzsche’s texts.
In the second part of the paper, I will use Nietzsche’s clear characterizations of the
preconditions of human perfection, particularly those he offers in BGE, to counter or at least to
seriously qualify assumptions central to the accounts rendered in section one. I will argue firstly
that the interpretive missteps these commentators make can be traced back to two mistaken
assumptions. The first is that Nietzsche’s representations of the preconditions for human
perfection are prescriptive in nature as opposed to descriptive. The second is that Nietzsche’s
views regarding the character of these preconditions remain nearly static throughout the periods
of his publications. Where my interlocutors spy only minor shifts in Nietzsche’s
characterizations, I will show that Nietzsche makes clean breaks. Finally, I will lay out what I
take to be Nietzsche’s descriptive account of the conditions of human perfection, an account
which is clear-eyed about their rapacious character but that obviates his seeming relish for
rapine.
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THE CULTURAL READING

Andrew Huddleston offers an insightful version of the paradigmatic view I introduced
above, in which Nietzsche is read as depicting an aristocratic society whose flourishing
ultimately redounds to the benefit rather than the detriment of those it exploits. I will refer to this
generic interpretation as the “cultural reading.” In “Consecration to Culture: Nietzsche on
Slavery and Human Dignity,” Huddleston suggests that, given the hyperbolic force his language,
Nietzsche is often naturally misread as advocating slavery. Against this “natural” interpretation,
Huddleston asserts the following: “In this paper I will spell out what conception of a person’s
flourishing Nietzsche is working with, what sense of ‘slavery’ he has in mind, and why he thinks
this form of ‘slavery’ is the best sort of life for all but a few individuals” (Huddleston 2014, 136).
Huddleston’s initial remarks will accordingly be definitional. He will attempt to explain
what Nietzsche intends by such terms as ‘interest,’ and ‘flourishing,’ and since Huddleston’s
central concern involves the question, “what, on Nietzsche’s view, is in the interests of a given
set of people,” we might look first at what he thinks Nietzsche means by the term, ‘interest.’
Firstly, Huddleston insists this term should not be taken idiomatically, or in the sense that we
might refer, for instance, to one’s interest who (to use Huddleston’s example) wishes to whileaway his days lazing in a drunken stupor. Rather he thinks what Nietzsche has in mind is “the
more paternalistic, father-knows-best sense of ‘interest,’ where the word ‘interest’ often gets
prefaced by ‘best.’” This sense of the term carries the implication that one could in some sense
be estranged from one’s own interests. While it may be possible to conceive of an individual
being alienated from or mistaken about her own desires, it is much easier to imagine someone
being oblivious to or mistaken about what is in her own best interest in some matter. Huddleston
thinks this is the sense in which Nietzsche uses the term when referring to morality (pejoratively)
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as being contrary to the interest of some. Thus, Huddleston refers to ‘interests’ in the sense of
‘objective interests,’ to accentuate the idea that one’s interests might well be something other
than what one desires or even believes is in one’s best interest.
Huddleston, then, refers to this notion of erroneously believing something is in one’s best
interest as the individual’s laboring under a “false consciousness” about that belief. False
consciousness will come to mean more than this, but initially he speaks of it in terms of a false
sense of what is in one’s real interests. Huddleston wants to say that, because Nietzsche’s
correctives generally appear to be aimed at higher types, many Nietzsche commentators naturally
assume that it is primarily the powerful who are under the influence of false consciousness
respecting their real interests. That is to say, it appears to be the aristocrat not the plebian whom
Nietzsche strives to disabuse of the belief that morality “in the pejorative sense” is in his best
interest. Huddleston, however, disagrees with this narrow ascription of false consciousness. He
argues that Nietzsche does not restrict the notion of false consciousness to the aristocracy.
Rather, he says, “Instead of confining this false consciousness to the Nietzschean elite, we
should, I will be arguing here, see the rest of mankind – ‘the weak’ – as afflicted by it as well.
For although it is right that the weak benefit from the morality system in several ways, on
another, more important level Nietzsche sees them as its victims” (Huddleston 2014, 140).
It is not clear to me why Huddleston thinks Nietzsche confining false consciousness to
the elite is a “prominent reading” or a received view, given that the preponderance of the
literature seems to take it that the generality of mankind has been seduced by the ideology of
religious morality. Perhaps Huddleston is merely nodding here to a consensus in the literature
that sees Nietzsche’s as relatively unconcerned about the weak. In any event, he attempts to
overthrow this “prominent reading” by invoking what Nietzsche portrays as the duping of the
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greater portion of mankind by the priestly class, by Kant, Bentham, and more “secular” moral
thinkers. He takes it that in Nietzsche’s mind their ideologies were, after Christianity itself, the
principal sources of inspiration for false consciousness in the sense described, and he spends the
first part of the essay explaining their popularity and significance.
According to Huddleston, these ideologies appealed to the underclass broadly speaking
in at least two respects. In the first place, Kant, the utilitarians, and the priests, as peddlers of
Christian dogma and morality, were trading on the profound suffering and existential
uncertainties of the weak. They played upon their anxieties, their aversion to suffering, and their
need for meaning in the face of suffering and certain death. In exchange for this worldly unease
these teachers tendered certitude and meaning. Their ideologies offered the weak an explanation
for their suffering, and just as importantly, the pledge of ultimate vindication on Judgment Day
when they will be eternally rewarded and their oppressors eternally damned. Nietzsche himself
describes the appeal of their dogma in characteristically ironic terms,
In faith in what? In love of what? In hope of what? – These weak ones – for
they too want to be the strong ones someday, there is no doubt, someday
their “kingdom” too shall come – “the kingdom of God” as they simply call
it, as I mention earlier: they are so humble in all things after all! Even to
experience that people will need to live a long time, beyond death – indeed
they need eternal life so that in the” kingdom of God” they can recoup their
losses… (GM I:15)
These ideologies appealed to a hidden lust for power that the weak were too disingenuous to
acknowledge, and Nietzsche has here stripped the cloak of hypocrisy from the supposedly meek
and humble who craved power like everyone else.
But according to Huddleston, Nietzsche’s scorn for the weak and especially for
their attachment to the “next world” is inspired by something more pernicious than the pretense
he puts his finger on here. It is their nihilistic devaluation of the present world that aroused his
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ire, “this nihilism of otherworldliness (that) denigrates even the best that we living human beings
can attain in the name of something we cannot…” (Thompson 2011, 12). The moralists and
priestly class enticed them to embrace a vocation whose spurious succor diverted them from
what Nietzsche considers their true calling, something Huddleston insists is decidedly thisworldly: “Nietzsche thinks that their highest calling is a strenuous one that they will try to avoid.
The best life is one of participation in, or in the service of, the cultural sphere, whether it be
through promoting the lives of a few great individuals, or in aiding the flourishing of the cultural
whole.” (Huddleston 2014, 141) Nietzsche, it would appear, agrees. For it is in opposition to just
such metaphysical enticements that Zarathustra counters with an appeal of his own:
I beseech you my brothers remain faithful to the earth and do not believe
those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes. Poison mixers are they,
whether they know it or not. Despisers of life are they, decaying and
poisoned themselves, of whom the earth is weary so let them go. Once the
sin against God was the greatest sin; but God died and these sinners died
with him. To sin against the earth is now the most dreadful thing, and to
esteem the entrails of the unknowable higher than the meaning of the earth.
(Z Prologue 3)
Zarathustra expresses this admonition in the context of articulating his vision for human
flourishing. He warns against the corrupt counsel of those that despise life. They are those who
continue to promote duty to a deceased unknowable deity whose authority has been obviated by
his visible entrails. Humanity’s duty (to promote human flourishing) is a this-worldly vocation,
and to neglect it in pursuit of an illusory hope or spurious comfort would be sinful. Sinful
because whatever profit might be gained in the service of such moral pursuits would ultimately
serve to deflect humanity from their true vocation. And Huddleston insists this true vocation is
an attenuated form of slavery: “(t)he benefits gained by the weak are meretricious when set
against what Nietzsche regards as needed if they are to truly flourish: and that is to be ‘slaves’ –
in some attenuated sense, at least…” (Huddleston 2014, 140).
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The other broad sense in which these ideologies appealed to the weak was this: they
conferred upon their signatories a certain dignity. According to Huddleston, the devotees of
“Christianity (and the morality it spawned) were deceived into accepting the delusion that they
are atomic individuals of infinite worth” (Huddleston 2014, 140). Kant assured them they were
ends in themselves. The priests taught them that they bore the image of God, that they were in
fact the “apple of his eye” and possessed immortal souls. In Nietzsche’s words,
That everyone as an “immortal soul” has equal rank with everyone else, that
in the totality of living beings the “salvation” of every single individual may
claim eternal significance, that little gnats and three-quarter-madmen may
have the conceit that the laws of nature are constantly broken for their sakes
– such an intensification of every kind of selfishness into the infinite, into
the impertinent, cannot be branded with too much contempt. And yet
Christianity owes its triumph to this miserable flattery of personal vanity: it
was precisely all the failures, all the rebellious-minded, all the less favored,
the whole scum and refuse of humanity who were thus won over to it. The
“salvation of the soul” – in plain language: the world revolves around me (A
43).
The moralists’ masterstroke was persuading those who were intended as grist for the mill that
they were in fact, finished loaves. The appeal and ultimate triumph of Christianity, according to
Nietzsche, was this power to invert the individuals’ sense of self-worth, to persuade those whom
even the Apostle Paul deemed the “refuse and offscouring of the world” (I Cor. 4:13), that each
one of them was a locus of the intense interest and redemptive activity of the creator. Under this
new moral regime, the notion of social rank was obliterated – the dignity of the individual was
regarded as innate. The priests and moralists inculcated this principle of intrinsic human value
unanimously, and of all its pernicious tendencies, its most contemptable in Nietzsche’s view was
its inflationary and egalitarian view of innate human worth.
However, Huddleston cautions us against supposing that because Nietzsche rejects the
idea of innate human dignity he therefore attributes human worth exclusively or even primarily
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to the elite. For he says that while Nietzsche is at odds with conceptions of innate human worth
and dignity, he nevertheless sees these virtues themselves as fair game for everyone. But by
Nietzsche’s lights they must be earned. As Huddleston expresses the matter,
Although Nietzsche’s conception of human worth and dignity is alien to
more traditional Christian and Kantian conceptions of these terms, the idea
of human worth and dignity, as the grounds on which a person merits
respect, plays a central role in his value theory. The most basic difference
between Nietzschean worth and dignity on the one hand and Christian and
Kantian worth and dignity on the other is that Christian and Kantian worth
and dignity is something that humans have equally and innately.
Nietzschean worth and dignity, by contrast is inegalitarian and achieved:
humans do not have it equally; they must earn it and earn the respect it
merits by what they do. (Huddleston 2014, 143)
Huddleston takes Nietzsche’s conception of human worth and dignity to be within the reach of
everyone, even in an aristocratic society. A socially rigid aristocratic society such as this might
be described as meritocratic in character. Huddleston will attempt to exploit this point further on
in offering it in support for his thesis that the social system Nietzsche describes, particularly the
slavery it involves, constitutes its own form of thriving and is on that basis ultimately benign to
the slave. If human worth and dignity can be achieved by anyone and everyone regardless of
their social station or even their caste, then one may flourish in a social system regardless of
social station or even caste.
In order to make the connection between a meritocracy and human dignity clearer
Huddleston explains at length how Nietzsche defines human worth. He does so initially by
explaining Nietzsche’s aversion for the modern liberal incarnation of the concept. His disdain for
the individual’s “claim to eternal significance” and innate worth can be explained in part by his
cultural perfectionism. Huddleston puts his finger on the connection between this perfectionistic
outlook and its impact on the notion of worth by pointing to the quotation with which we opened
the present essay. In Part IX of BGE Nietzsche speaks of the presupposition of human
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perfection. Huddleston reminds us that one of those presuppositions is the availability of an
underclass “to render its achievement possible” (Huddleston 2014, 145), and he says that this is a
recurring theme throughout Nietzsche’s writings.
Other commentators agree. Jeffrey Church, in an article entitled, “Nietzsche’s Early
Perfectionism: A Cultural Reading of ‘The Greek State,’” says something very similar: “[in]
most human cultures according to Nietzsche, ideals are generated by an aristocratic class that
enjoins culture to self-transcendence” (Church 2015, 252). In connection with this theme Church
asks, “What is the problem with the ethical idea of the ‘dignity of man’” (Church 2015, 252)? He
answers that in Nietzsche’s judgment such ideals are antagonistic to the cultural selftranscendence towards which societies aim.
For Nietzsche, the problem with these optimistic ideals is that they give rise
to an infinite longing for equality among human beings, a final condition in
which all people equally recognize one another’s dignity. For Nietzsche,
this infinite longing supplants our desire for excellence and transcendence.
At the same time, these abstract liberal ideals point away from collective
ethical goals and toward individual goals, toward the value of individuals
over groups. The “dignity of man” presupposes that individuals’ worth
precedes or stands apart from their function in any political or cultural
community. As individuals internalize this abstract conception of humanity,
they may “recognize the state only to the extent to which they conceive it to
be in their own interest” and regard the state “as a means” to their own
individual ends (GSt 182–83). In other words, these abstract ethical ideals
attenuate our connection to particular communities and hence throw us back
upon our own “selfish” material aims. (Church 2015, 242)
If it is true that Nietzsche is a cultural perfectionist, and that, as Church suggests, most human
cultures, according to Nietzsche, generate ideals that conduce to cultural self-transcendence, then
it is not odd to find Nietzsche estranged from ideals that “point away from the collective,” or that
attempt to define the individual worth in terms that abstract from his community.
Accordingly, we ought not be surprised if when Huddleston characterizes
Nietzsche’s conception of human dignity it more closely accords with the ideals of a society
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seeking its own transcendence than it might with the “attenuated” aims of the individual. With
this broader social context in view Huddleston directs us to some of Nietzsche’s early writings in
which he is first exploring the notion of human worth. One of the passages he quotes is from The
Greek State:
Every man, with his whole activity, is only dignified to the extent that he is
a tool of genius, consciously or unconsciously; whereupon we immediately
deduce the ethical conclusion that “man as such,” absolute man, possesses
neither dignity nor rights nor duties: only as a completely determined being,
serving unconscious purposes, can man excuse his existence. (GSt 185)
Nietzsche is here asserting that an individual’s worth is not derived from the dignity that accrues
to him as a human being, but rather from the service that he renders to genius or to an exemplary
human being, or to society. Huddleston observes that Nietzsche’s assertions here are remarkable
in several respects. In the first place Nietzsche is not merely offering an alternative or a
complementary way to conceive of human dignity. Servitude, or more pointedly, becoming a
tool for another’s use is the only means to acquire worth or dignity for most. He has foreclosed
the Christian and Kantian conception of human worth. More than that, he has contravened them:
“Nietzsche’s departure from the Christian and Kantian philosophical tradition surrounding
dignity is here notable. Whereas this tradition would have it that being used as a mere means is
incompatible with a person’s innate dignity, Nietzsche appears to be suggesting that being used
as a means (maybe even a mere means) is how most can attain dignity” (Huddleston 2014, 150).
Huddleston here is incorporating the notion referenced above that dignity is earned into the
concept of service to an exemplar. He attempts to amalgamate these two notions in the following
manner:
Nietzsche certainly thinks that the weak do seek comfortable safe lives – a
choice rendered vivid in Nietzsche’s depiction of the “last man” in the
Prologue of Zarathustra. But that is a far cry from thinking that the best life
for them is of this sort. On the contrary, Nietzsche thinks that their highest
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calling is a strenuous one that they will try to avoid. The best life is one of
participation in, or in the service of, the cultural sphere, whether it be
through promoting the lives of a few great individuals or in aiding the
flourishing of the cultural whole. The best life for a weak person is in this
respect not so different from the best life for a strong person. Both are
called to a higher form of life. (Huddleston 2014, 141)
Secondly, and relatedly, Nietzsche seems to suggest that it is necessary for man to excuse or
vindicate his very existence. How does this assertion square with the notion that man has no
rights, no obligations? Huddleston ties these concepts together by referring to remarks that
Nietzsche makes in The Birth of Tragedy: “for only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and
the world eternally justified” (BT 5). As Huddleston points out, for Nietzsche it is not having an
immortal soul that justifies the human being’s existence, it is his completely-determined nature,
his “whole activity” that will or will not provide him with an excuse to exist depending on
whether that activity was directed toward the service of an exemplar (GSt 185).
Huddleston then traces a line from this early, seminal conception of human dignity in GSt
to similar references in BGE, in which Nietzsche refers to the elite as the ultimate “justification”
and “meaning” of the weak:
But what is essential in a good and healthy Aristocracy is that it [ its rulingclass] does not feel itself to be a function (be it of the monarchy or of the
polity), but its meaning and highest justification – that it therefore accept in
good conscience the sacrifice of countless people who for its sake have to
be oppressed and reduced to incomplete human beings, to slaves and
instruments (BGE 258).
The passage from GSt asserts that all men derive their dignity and their justification for existence
from the service they render to the great. The passage from BGE makes the same assertion but
from the opposite direction; it states that the great lend dignity and worth to the lives of slaves
and the oppressed by enjoining their service. The point Huddleston wishes to draw from the
parallel is that the category “slaves and instruments” here, is equivalent to the category “every

12
man” there, and that Nietzsche’s reference to slaves and instruments is merely a reference to the
majority: all those not numbered among the elite. In other words, the phrase “slaves and
instruments” is functional in character, and not a literal reference to those in human bondage.
Huddleston expresses the matter thus: “in using the extraordinarily provocative term ‘slavery,’
Nietzsche is among other things, seeking to remind his readers about the functional similarity
between the role filled by the slaves in ancient Greece and Rome and the role filled by those who
create the material and spiritual conditions that make cultural achievement possible more
generally” (Huddleston 2014, 146). He wants to assert that Nietzsche takes the dignity of the
non-elite to entail the non-elite’s enslavement in some sense or other, and that, in whatever sense
the word is intended, “slavery” does not mean human bondage but some mode of service to an
exemplar. Says Huddleston: “Nietzsche uses the term [slavery] to pick out the condition of those
who in the following passage he goes on to describe as forming the ‘foundation and scaffolding’
(BGE 258) that makes for a culture of exceptional human excellence” (Huddleston 2014, 146).
The distinguishing feature of those included in this broad lower class is their
‘mediocrity.’ Huddleston is referencing here a passage from the Antichrist in which Nietzsche
similarly refers to those who form the base of the social pyramid as uniformly mediocre. His
point is that the sole source of meaning and dignity for the non-elite, owing to the paucity of his
natural gifts, is to become the tool of genius. The paternalistic justification for the broad
classifications of those who serve and those who rule on natural grounds is reminiscent of the
justification offered by Aristotle for his conception of natural slavery: “For that some should rule
and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient: from the hour of their birth,
some men are marked out for subjection, others for rule... It is clear, then, that some men are by
nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and just.”
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(Politics 1.6). Though Huddleston is referring to slaves in the functional sense, like Aristotle he
sees, or interprets Nietzsche as seeing, the slave’s dignity as a function of his utility, and his
service as a benefit to all concerned:
[Nietzsche’s] idea, as I have said, is not simply that it is socially or
culturally useful to have slaves, or useful to the privileged few to have
slaves, but that the sort of slavery he is envisaging is actually in the best
interest of the slaves themselves. While this view may be completely
anathema to our moral sensibilities, it has certain affinities with the
paternalistic views about slavery held by both Plato and Aristotle. Nietzsche
builds on these views, but makes the notion of slavery much more
attenuated and much less obviously political in import. (Huddleston 2014,
147-8; the italics are mine)
In suggesting that we conceive the notion of slavery Nietzsche is working with as “attenuated” in
some sense, Huddleston is not implying that we take Nietzsche to be describing a sedentary way
of life, by any means. He says in fact that such lives might well be perilous, painful, and
distasteful; some may in fact perish. He gives an illustration of what he has in mind in the form
of an imaginary account of an individual transformed by his sacrifice to culture. He tells the
story of a minor merchant in fifteenth-century Florence who leads a quiet comfortable life selling
odds and ends along a span of bridge above the Arno. At some point he becomes inspired by the
great architect, Brunelleschi and by the towering grandeur of Brunelleschi’s unfinished
cathedral. He forsakes his own employ to join in the decades-long project to finish the dome. He
suffers now; his life is much more difficult. “But he also has the sense that he’s doing something
important” (Huddleston 2014, 151). Huddleston’s illustration is meant to convey the idea of an
individual flourishing as the instrument of an exemplar.
Huddleston takes this as an illustration of what Nietzsche intended when referring to
slaves as the “instruments” of the ruling-class: “a good and healthy aristocracy should not
hesitate to accept in good conscience the sacrifice of countless people who for its sake have to be
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oppressed and reduced to incomplete human beings, to slaves and instruments” (BGE 258). What
Huddleston is in fact suggesting is that any modern individual, without the loss of either rights or
self-ownership, might fill the role previously played by a slave in advancing his culture.
Huddleston takes “slavery in some sense,” or, in an “attenuated” sense, to be merely analogous
to the real thing.
Others to be sure share Huddleston’s read of the statements in BGE regarding an
attenuated form of slavery. In the article by Church referenced above he says something very
similar to Huddleston:
Nietzsche does not literally advocate slavery … for the modern age, but
rather sees “slavery” … as [a] functional term that can be embodied in any
number of empirical forms. Nietzsche claims that “slavery belongs to the
essence of a culture [Kultur],” yet it is not clear what he means by
“slavery.” In discussing the Greek state, he clearly means the political
institution of slavery. However, he states in the first line of the essay that
moderns behave in a “slave-like [sklavisch] manner” (GSt 176); slavery in
modernity goes “under a more moderate name,” and in his later work he
goes on to speak of slavery “in some sense” being necessary (HH 283; GS
18, 377; BGE 242, 257). Nietzsche contrasts the “naivete of the ancients in
their distinction between the slaves and the free” with the moderns who are
“prudish and refined, slavery is in our character” (KSA 7:3[44]). In all these
passages, Nietzsche is suggesting that modern citizens may serve the
function that the slaves played in the Greek world while still retaining legal
rights. Such a reading is supported by Nietzsche’s expansive definition of a
slave, which is any individual who devotes his or her life to the “struggle”
for existence.” Under this definition, many individuals in a modern
economy … fit this description. (Church 2015, 242)
In these remarks from “A Cultural Reading of ‘The Greek State,’” Jeffrey Church is weighing in
on one of the central debates surrounding Nietzsche’s perfectionism, the controversy between
those who characterize Nietzsche’ perfectionism as democratic and those who regard it as
aristocratic or elitist. While Church sees strains of egalitarianism in Nietzsche’s perfectionism,
he dismisses out of hand the democratic reading as overly simplistic. And though he seems in the
end inclined toward the aristocratic reading, he wants ultimately to move past this debate to say
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something important about the social and political implications of his own reading of Nietzsche’s
perfectionism. His thesis is that, in “The Greek State,” Nietzsche’s aim is not to urge “a return to
Greek institutional models,” including slavery, but to point toward what he calls a “higher
possibility for modern politics and culture” (Church 2015, 248).
In support of his thesis Church offers and develops three exegetical points from “The
Greek State.” The first point is that Nietzsche’s focus in that work is on “liberal democratic
ideals, not institutions.” In his view Nietzsche’s focus in his discussions of slavery is on the
vestiges of the slavish mentality and mediocrity in the minds of moderns. “Slavery is in our
character.” His second point is that Nietzsche makes it clear that he considers slavery to be a
reprehensible affair. And Church’s third point is that Nietzsche appears to favor modern
“functional alternatives” to the ancient institutions of slavery and war.
Church’s first point, that Nietzsche is concerned much more with the character and
implications of modern ideals than with modern politics, puts him at odds with the standard
aristocratic interpretation that sees Nietzsche as celebrating the politics of violence either out of
some aesthetic love of brutality or for its apparent resonance with the will to power. But Church
interprets Nietzsche’s remarks along these lines to reflect his belief that something like war, for
instance, is “the only means of overcoming the atomistic individualism resulting from …
enlightenment ethical ideals.” Nietzsche, in other words, sees war (or even the mere threat of
war) as a better state of affairs than one which would enable the individual to ignore, absent such
external pressure, the interests of the collective.
The standard aristocratic interpretation, as Church sees it, also has it that Nietzsche
celebrates the political institution of slavery for much the same reasons its interpreters take him
to celebrate war. However, Church observes that Nietzsche’s attitude toward slavery was more
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consonant with the way in which the Greeks ultimately regarded that institution: it “was for the
Greeks a ‘terrible premise’; it aroused ‘shame,’ and it is a ‘truth’ that ‘gnaws at the liver of the
Promethean promoter of culture.” That is to say, Nietzsche saw slavery as a “necessary evil”
(Church 2015, 254)
Church’s final point is that Nietzsche’s assertion that slavery “belongs to the essence of
culture” can be interpreted as something other than the claim that slavery in its ancient form is a
necessary feature of modern culture. Nietzsche says in fact that in the modern age slavery is
recognized “under a more moderate name.” Church seems to want to identify the “modern wage
worker” as the functional counterpart to the slave in the Ancien Regime.
In the next section I will explore the difficulties I see with this interpretation (and with
Huddleston’s) in some detail. However there are a few remarks that are worth noting here. The
first is that, while it is easy to see how a modern slave could serve any number of the ends of a
modern monetary society, Church fails to explain in what sense a modern wage worker can be
taken to serve the ends of a cultural exemplar simply by virtue of his status as a “wage slave.” It
seems just as likely that, by putting his finger on the fact that there are many in the modern age
that are “enslaved by material necessity,” Nietzsche is merely noting that the modern, by failing
to recognize his purpose in relation to the exemplar, not only misses his true calling but is
materially little better off in the service of his selfish material ends than was his ancient Greek
counterpart.

3

AN IMAGINED THROUGHLINE

Church’s remarks here and those of Huddleston we have examined so far both run
aground on a series of interpretive errors. Both commentators see a particularly prominent theme
running through many of Nietzsche’s earlier and later writings, through for instance, GSt and
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UM on one end, and BGE and A on the other. Because both Huddleston and Church regard this
theme – the contribution of a servile underclass to the advancement of culture – as a throughline,
both commentators interpret Nietzsche’s treatment of this theme in BGE in the light of what they
take to be parallel treatments of it in the earlier and later writings. In fact, Huddleston claims that
apart from some shifts in Nietzsche’s own subjective attitude toward the servitude in question,
his objective characterizations of it “remain constant from his early essays (“The Greek State”)
to his final works of 1888 (A 57)” (Huddleston 2014, 146).
The interpretive error embedded in the assumption of this supposed throughline is this: in
GSt and in A, works that preceded and followed BGE respectively, Nietzsche’s focus is in fact
cultural flourishing. But in BGE, Nietzsche’s central concern is not with culture, per se, but with
the perfection of the human species. For in BGE Nietzsche consistently bypasses references to
cultural perfection preferring instead references to human perfection, which he variously styles,
“the enhancement of the type ‘man’” (BGE 257). This shift in focus was significant enough for
Nietzsche to have remarked years after the publication of BGE that his treatment of the “type
man” in BGE was a substantially more “spiritual and radical” account than any he’d attempted
before or since (EH ‘Books: BGE’ 2). Just so, the mistake Huddleston and Church make is that
they fail to appreciate the exceptionally “spiritual and radical” character of BGE.
Regarding the sense in which Nietzsche takes the account in BGE to be more “spiritual”
than most, I will have more to say hereafter. But its radical character should already be clear
from Nietzsche’s complete shift in emphasis in that work from culture to the human species.
Some idea of what Nietzsche intended by “the perfection of the species” and its radical nature
can be gotten from texts as early as “Schopenhauer as Educator:”
Humanity shall perpetually work at producing individual great men – this
and no other is its task. How much one would like to apply a lesson to
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society and its goals, a lesson that can be learned from the observation of
any species in the animal or plant world, that is only concerned with the
individual higher specimen, the more unusual, more powerful, more
complicated and more fruitful specimen. (SE 6)
Nietzsche regards the perfection of the species as the development of the highest and rarest
qualities of which humans are capable. Because he believes only a very rare few are capable of
the realizing this goal the perfection of the species focuses on the greatest possible realization of
this goal in the rarest few. As an ethical goal it is radical in the sense that it involves a
thoroughgoing shift in focus from a generally acceptable aim – the promotion of culture – to a
much less frequently conceived goal of human good – promoting the welfare of the few: “He
who is capable of raising himself to this further stage is struck first of all by how sparse and rare
knowledge of this goal [the production of the genius] is, how universal, by contrast, cultural
endeavor is and what an unspeakable amount of energy is expended on its service” (SE 6).
With regard then to the cultural reading, its first interpretive misstep was mistaking this
radical account of human perfection in BGE for the more generic account of cultural flourishing
elaborated in texts like GSt and A. And having made this initial error of treating these themes as
though they were equivalent, Huddleston and Church make the further mistake of trading on
their terms, of supposing Nietzsche’s references to those who must be treated as less than human
in BGE could possibly refer, for instance, to the mistreatment of the doctors, accountants, and
professors he alludes to in GSt. For so suggests Church:
Nietzsche is suggesting that modern citizens may serve the function that the
slaves played in the Greek world while still retaining legal rights. Such a
reading is supported by Nietzsche’s expansive definition of a slave, which
is any individual who devotes his or her life to the ‘struggle for existence.’
(Church 2015, 242)
And so says Huddleston:

19
In using the extra ordinarily provocative term “slavery,” Nietzsche is,
among other things, seeking to remind his readers about the functional
similarity between the role filled by the slaves in ancient Greece and Rome
and the role filled by those who create the material and spiritual conditions
that make cultural achievement possible more generally. When he refers
cagily to ‘slavery in some sense or other’ (BGE 257), Nietzsche uses the
term to pick out the condition of those who, in the following passage, he
goes on to describe as forming the ‘foundation and scaffolding [Unterbau
und Gerus]’ (BGE 258) that makes for a culture of exceptional human
excellence. His discussion of this servile underclass of ‘mediocrity’ in The
Antichrist suggests that he construes it very broadly indeed (57). It would
appear to extend far beyond those who are the legally-sanctioned chattel of
others … Everyone from doctors to accountants to menial laborers and
professors would seem to be included. (HH I.283) (Huddleston 2014, 146)
Huddleston’s claim here is that the reference to ‘slavery’ in BGE 257 is hyperbolic and merely
points to the slave’s function as a servile promoter of culture, not necessarily to the slave’s status
as chattel. Nietzsche authorizes this expanded conception of the term ‘slavery,’ as Huddleston
sees it, by the use of the phrase, “slavery in some sense or other” in BGE. Huddleston wants to
make the point that there are any number of grades and modes of servitude that are apt to
promote cultural flourishing and that actual slavery is merely one of those modes. So, on this
reading the reference to ‘slavery’ in the passage is primarily intended to be evocative of the
servile nature of those that are called upon to advance culture.
The appeal of this interpretation is of course its firm grounding in the other texts these
commentators reference to support it. My hesitation with this interpretation is two-fold. Firstly,
these commentators tend to appeal primarily to texts external to BGE to establish it. Secondly,
and relatedly, the claim that there are modes of servility less harsh than chattel slavery that are
nevertheless still capable of promoting culture is, in fact, an assertion that Nietzsche makes. But
it is irrelevant to the more radical claim he makes in BGE. For when Nietzsche says in this
volume, that is, in BGE, that slavery is fundamental to any society in which the exceptional are
driven to self-transcendence, the very best evidence we have that he is not speaking
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hyperbolically is his own clear statement in that volume that he isn’t. For in this publication at
least, not only does he claim to be speaking from “the other end from all modern ideology,” but
from their very “antipodes,” in fact (BGE 44). That is, not only does he wish to be understood as
speaking in opposition to liberal conceptions of the categories he uses, but he wishes to be
understood as speaking in extreme opposition to them. Just so, the radical sense in which we are
expected to understand this claim must be derived from its immediate context, from its actual
articulation in BGE, rather than from the texts to which the cultural interpreters mistakenly
appeal for clarification.
Undoubtedly Huddleston would agree with me regarding the hermeneutical significance
of context, but perhaps only to a degree. For in the passage from “Consecration to Culture” I
quoted most recently above, Huddleston first says that Nietzsche clarifies what he intends by
“slavery in some sense or other” (BGE 257) in the section following the one in which that phrase
is found (Huddleston 2014, 146). There, in section 258, Nietzsche refers to slaves, the class of
individuals in question, as the “foundation and scaffolding on which a choice type of being is
able to raise itself to its higher task and to a higher state of being” (BGE 258). But rather than
referring in turn to the immediate context of this passage for clarification, i.e., the section in
which it is found and the sections that precede and follow it, Huddleston defaults to another
Nietzsche text for the needed illumination, namely A. That is, after appropriately identifying the
slaves in BGE 257 with the “foundation and scaffolding” in BGE 258, Huddleston
inappropriately (in my view) refers to what appears to him to be a parallel text in A for purposes
of amplification. In a passage I have already quoted in part, Huddleston puts the matter thus,
[Nietzsche’s] discussion of this servile underclass of mediocrity in The
Antichrist suggests that he construes it very broadly indeed (A 57). It would
appear to extend far beyond those who are the legally-sanctioned chattel of
others, and it would appear to extend beyond even a proletariat working
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class conventionally understood: “A high culture,” he writes in The
Antichrist, “is a pyramid: it can stand only on a broad base; its first
presupposition is a strong and soundly consolidated mediocrity. Handicraft,
trade, agriculture, science, the greatest part of art, the whole quintessence of
professional activity, to sum it up, is compatible only with a mediocre
amount of ability and ambition” (A 57). (Huddleston 2014, 147)
In fairness, the apparent parallels between Nietzsche’s description of the underclass as a
foundation and scaffolding in BGE 258, and his description of it in A as the broad base of a
pyramid, are striking. But there are sufficient indications in both of these texts (BGE and A) to
suggest they are describing two distinct relations between the underclass and the elite. In BGE
Nietzsche, as before mentioned, never refers to culture, per se. His descriptions there consistently
relate an underclass to exceptional individuals self-absorbed in their own individual enterprises
of self-transcendence. Whereas in A, UM and GSt, all of which the cultural interpreters reference
as proof-texts, Nietzsche is almost always describing an entire social structure in which two
classes of people are more or less ideally related in their pursuit of common cultural enterprises.
In addition to these descriptive discrepancies between BGE and the other textual
accounts, there are, particularly in the first three sections of BGE Part IX, internally consistent
descriptions of the true relation in question that are so distinct in character and content from
Nietzsche’s earlier writings, that they erase any possibility of the throughline insisted on by the
cultural theorists. As suggested earlier, the radical character of the precondition we are
discussing, i.e., the real significance of the relation described between the underclass and the
elite, is a function of the radical principles Nietzsche develops in BGE. Of particular interest to
the present discussion is the genetic account developed in the first three sections of the book’s
concluding chapter, in which Nietzsche unearths the origins of the type of society he sees as
most favorable to the advancement of the species. By excavating the structural origin of one
particular type of society, which he identifies as an aristocracy, he claims to unearth along with it
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a crucial “presupposition” or precondition for the advancement of the human type as a whole.
That this is his intent is clear from the following remark in BGE 257: “[to] be sure, one should
not yield to humanitarian illusions about the origins of an aristocratic society (and thus of the
presupposition of this enhancement of the type ‘man’): the truth is hard.” The clear implication
here is that the factors that lead to the formation of aristocracies just are, as Nietzsche sees it,
preconditions for the advancement of the species.
Nietzsche’s reference here to the presupposition of human perfection will in fact reveal
itself to be a reference to a cluster of preconditions. Let’s look, then, at the structural origin of
aristocratic societies as described by Nietzsche to see what it tells us about the preconditions in
question. In the last paragraph of BGE 257 he describes the typical development of an
aristocracy as follows:
Human beings whose nature was still natural, barbarians in every terrible
sense of the word, men of prey who were still in possession of unbroken
strength of will and lust for power, hurled themselves upon weaker, more
civilized more peaceful races, perhaps traders or cattle raisers, or upon
mellow old cultures whose last vitality was even then flaring up in splendid
fireworks of spirit and corruption. (BGE 257)
Nietzsche suggests that aristocratic societies typically arise as the product of violent wholesale
assaults perpetrated by one people on another. He describes the perpetrators of these assaults as
men who were still natural in the sense that their own societies had as yet not blunted their
natural passions, nor broken their wills for preeminence. But more importantly for our purposes,
in the third section of BGE Part IX, in addition to describing their dispositions as natural, he also
describes their behavior as natural, in the sense that it accorded with what he calls “the will of
life”: “life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien, and weaker,
suppression, hardness, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and at its mildest,
exploitation …” (BGE 259).
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Nietzsche gives a strikingly similar account of the origins of aristocratic societies in GM,
which was published just after BGE and which he refers to as a “supplement and clarification” of
the earlier work. In section 17 of the second essay, Nietzsche describes “how the ‘state’ began on
earth” in the following terms:
the welding of a hitherto unchecked and shapeless populace into a firm
form was not only instituted by an act of violence but was also carried to its
conclusion by nothing but acts of violence – that the oldest “state” thus
appeared as a fearful tyranny, as an oppressive and remorseless machine,
and went on working until this raw material of people and semi-animals
was at last not only thoroughly kneaded and pliant but also formed. I
employed the word “state”: it is obvious what is meant – some pack of
blonde beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race which, organized for war
and with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly laid its terrible claws upon a
populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and
nomad. That is after all how the “state” began on earth. (GM 2:17)
Like the earlier narrative in BGE, this later account describes nascent aristocracies as the
products of violent cataclysms. They are tyrannies set in motion and sustained by pitiless
oppression. What is more, just as he does in the earlier account, he characterizes the violent and
tyrannical behavior of these conquerors as natural in the sense that it is instinctual: “Their work
is an instinctive creation and imposition of forms: they are the most involuntary, unconscious
artists there are” (GM 2:17). But even more significantly for our purposes, Nietzsche tells us that
the end product of such wholesale rapine is “a ruling structure that lives” (GM 2:17). It has parts
whose functions are organically assigned to them by the organizing principle inherent in the
nature of the master race. And in the earlier work he refers to this organizing principle as “the
essence of what lives;” it is “a basic organic function;” and its results are “a consequence of the
will to power, which is after all the will of life” (BGE 259).
Nietzsche, then, characterizes the kinds of acts that produce aristocracies as consonant
with and springing from “the essence of what lives.” And in identifying the free expression of
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the will of life as crucial to the origin of an aristocracy, he has simultaneously put his finger on a
crucial factor, a presupposition, for the advancement of the species, namely, behavior expressive
of the will of life.
Although my purpose here is to provide a close reading of the preconditions for
human enhancement that Nietzsche develops in BGE in particular, his radical treatment of this
theme is not without precedent in his earlier works. In The Gay Science, for instance, he
characterizes the free expression of the will of life in human interactions as a virulent form of
vitalism in constant dialectical tension with the tendency of “all ordered society [to put] the
passions to sleep” (GS 4). And he poses then answers the question, “What preserves the species?
The strongest and most evil spirits have so far advanced humanity the most. They have always
rekindled the drowsing passions …” (GS 4).
In this passage Nietzsche’s attention is on the ebb and flow of human advancement as the
influence of the vitalism he describes there waxes and wanes. But in BGE he is concerned with
the institutionalization of the kind of behavior expressive of the will to life, in a word,
exploitation: “life itself is essentially approbation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and
weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and at least, at its
mildest, exploitation…” (BGE 259). According to Nietzsche, then, nascent aristocracies were
formed by institutionalizing, i.e., normalizing exploitation. For, the sustained and consistent
practice of this form of vitalism could only obtain in a society in which its expression has been
normalized. In BGE, he makes exactly this point. He describes these exploitive practices as
something that has become “ingrained” in these societies. Individuals are “kept down,” kept at a
distance; obedience and command are constantly practiced, and if an aristocracy is healthy, such
things will be done “in good conscience” (BGE 257,258).
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Here, then, Nietzsche has put his finger on another factor at play in the formation of
aristocracies, namely the normalization of behavior expressive of the will to life, that is, the
normalization of exploitative practices. However, in order to explain the sense in which this
normalization is a condition of human enhancement I need to say something about the
psychological state that Nietzsche associates with the imposition of these norms. Let’s look at
the full passage I quoted in part earlier, in which Nietzsche describes the process of this
normalization:
Without that pathos of distance which grows out of the ingrained difference
between strata – when the ruling caste constantly looks afar and looks down
upon subjects and instruments and just as constantly practices obedience
and command, keeping down and keeping at a distance – that other more
mysterious pathos could not have grown up either – the craving for an ever
new widening of distances within the soul itself, the development of an ever
higher, rarer, more remote, further-stretching, more comprehensive states –
in brief, simply the enhancement of the “type-man,” the continual “selfovercoming of man,” to use a moral formula in a supra-moral sense. (BGE,
257)
According to Nietzsche the instinctual and habitual imposition of exploitative norms is the
outward expression of a profound psychological state in the minds of the high-stationed.
Nietzsche refers to this affective state as the “pathos of distance” (BGE, 257). It is described here
as the state of mind of those who constantly look “down and afar” upon the weak and treat them
as “subjects and instruments.” But more to the point for our purposes, the pathos of distance is a
self-reflective state of mind. It is a kind of self-reverence. It is an egoism that could suggest to
itself without irony “that to a being such as ‘we are’ other beings must be subordinate by nature”
(BGE 265).
Nietzsche amplifies this self-reflective, self-reverential character of the pathos of
distance in GM: “it was the good themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, high-stationed,
and high-minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of first
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rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common and plebian. It was out of this
pathos of distance that they first seized the right to create values …” (GM I: 2). It is his
pronounced and sustained sense of self-approval over and against his contempt for the lowly,
that stirs the higher type to take to himself the prerogative to mint new values.
In this passage and in BGE 257 Nietzsche is specifically alluding to the very earliest
instances of value creation, values that resulted in the first master moralities. But if this pathos
enables the higher type to create values it also allows him to confront and challenge opposing
value systems. This was the point of the passage I referenced above (GS 4), in which Nietzsche
attributes the value-creating urge to the “strongest and most evil spirits” throughout as well as at
the start of human history. In that passage he identifies this value-creating urge with human
progress itself. For, the explanation given there for why the “strongest and most evil spirits” have
done the most for the species, is that their strength of soul enables them to challenge the status
quo, especially with respect to entrenched values and ideals. The full passage reads as follows:
“They [the strongest and most evil spirits] have always reawakened the sense of comparison, of
contradiction, of joy in the new, the daring and the untried; they force men to meet opinion with
opinion, model with model. For the most part by arms, by the overthrow of boundary stones, and
by offense to the pieties but also by new religions and moralities” (GS 4).
Nietzsche’s point here is that the strength required to problematize, to call into question
unconscious assumptions, to send thought into entirely new directions and the mind toward the
contemplation of new paradigms, is rare, and to do all this in a manner that is ongoing and lifeaffirming, is rarer still. BGE 257, in fact, asserts that this requisite strength of soul is peculiar to
certain societies. And these propensities are of the same description as those that in BGE
Nietzsche claims are conditioned by the normalization of exploitation. I refer here to what
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Nietzsche called “that other mysterious pathos” inspired by the pathos of distance. It is “the
craving for an ever new widening of distances within the soul itself, the development of ever
higher, rarer, more remote, further stretching, more comprehensive states,” All these proclivities
are productive of “the continual self-overcoming of man …” (BGE 257).
To recapitulate, my aim in this part of the paper is to show that, on the view that
Nietzsche holds in BGE, the normalization of exploitation is a condition of human enhancement.
I believe I have demonstrated as much by showing that, in Nietzsche’s view, this normalization
engenders a psychological state in the high-stationed that is peculiarly and powerfully conducive
to human progress. I also suggested, more broadly, that the cultural reading underappreciates
Nietzsche’s radical characterizations of the precondition for human enhancement by equating
them with his mitigated characterizations of the conditions of cultural flourishing. Nietzsche
characterizes the conditions of human enhancement as compulsory and ingrained; the cultural
theorist interpret the conditions of cultural flourishing as voluntary or circumstantial. But there is
another important aspect of the presupposition in question that I merely touched on earlier,
namely, its highly spiritual character. A closer look at this dimension of the presupposition of
human enhancement will, I believe, further serve to foreclose the possibility that Nietzsche’s
treatment of this presupposition could be read in the “attenuated sense” in which the cultural
theorists understand it.
In EH, Nietzsche suggests the passages from BGE which we have taken for our texts, if
not that volume in its entirety, are best understood in spiritual terms:
This book (1886) [BGE] is in all essentials a critique of modernity, not
excluding the modern sciences, modern arts, and even modern politics,
along with pointers to a contrary type that is as little modern as possible – a
noble, Yes-saying type. In the latter sense, the book is a school for the
gentilhomme, taking this concept in a more spiritual and radical sense than
has ever been done. (EH ‘Books: BGE’ 2)
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Nietzsche’s reference in EH to the spiritual (and radical) character of BGE apply, of course, to
the book as a whole. However, clearly it has peculiar application to BGE IX from which we have
drawn our proof-texts. For he makes especial mention of, and explicitly offers “a pointer to,” the
noble type portrayed in BGE IX, which is entitled, “What is Noble?” (EH ‘Books: BGE’ 2). That
we can still more narrowly focus Nietzsche’s “spiritual” ascription to the noble himself is also
clear. For in our passage from EH Nietzsche says that his treatment of the noble type in BGE was
intended as a school for this person-type. But if it was a school, it was intended not so much to
teach the higher-type what to do or how to behave, but to teach him how to recognize himself as
such. For he describes the project of BGE as part of “the slow search for those related to me”
(EH ‘Books BGE’ 1).
It is easiest to recognize this spiritual dimension of Nietzsche’s treatment of the
conditions for human enhancement when it is contrasted with the way in which the cultural
interpreters characterize these conditions. Recall that Jefferey Church takes these preconditions
to involve no more than a functional relationship between the higher and lower types of
individuals. I will quote at length here a passage I referenced in part earlier:
Nietzsche does not literally advocate slavery for the modern age but rather
sees slavery as a functional term that can be embodied in any number of
empirical forms. Nietzsche claims that slavery belongs to the essence of
culture [kulture], yet it is not clear what he means by ‘slavery.’ In
discussing the Greek state he clearly means the political institution of
slavery. However, he states in the first line of the essay that moderns behave
in a “slave-like [sklavisch] manner” (GSt 176); slavery in modernity goes
“under a more moderate name,” and in his later work he goes on to speak of
slavery “in some sense” being necessary (HH 283; GS 18,277; BGE 242,
257). In all these passages, Nietzsche is suggesting that modern citizens
may serve the function that slaves played in the Greek world, while still
retaining their legal rights. Such a reading is supported by Nietzsche’s
expansive definition of a slave, which is any individual who devotes his or
her life to the struggle for existence. (Church 2015, 254)
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The contributions of the underclass on this reading are material rather than spiritual in nature.
Since these individuals are unable to surmount their own material necessity, their contributions
to society must remain strictly material – that is, they provide the supports for those who are able
in fact to rise above the level of having to provide for themselves materially. These latter are then
free to apply themselves to cultural pursuits. The benefit to the privileged class is strictly
material in the sense that they have the freedom, time, and energy for such pursuits that they
otherwise would not have been able to enjoy.
Before returning to Huddleston’s description of the precondition for human
flourishing, I will briefly respond to Church. Apart from the observations I made earlier
regarding the improper use of texts outside of BGE to amplify Nietzsche’s descriptions of the
presupposition discussed within that text, I offer just two remarks. The first is that while this
material benefit to the privileged class could be viewed as a contributory condition for cultural or
even human perfection, it is so far from being the principal condition for either that Nietzsche
never once mentions it in BGE. Church is reading this material benefit into that text. The other
remark is that by Church’s reasoning, wealth by itself would serve as a cleaner fuel for driving
human perfection than any form of slavery ever could, ancient or modern. If the sole or even the
main benefit the underclass provide the elite were freedom, wealth would be the true
precondition for human perfection. Yet Nietzsche never mentions it in BGE in the context of this
discussion.
Andrew Huddleston’s picture of the presupposition for human flourishing is somewhat
more nuanced than Church’s depiction of it. Huddleston sees it as a cooperation between the elite
and the non-elite in which both classes of individuals ideally sacrifice their lives to promote
culture. He describes it as follows:

30
Talents of course vary widely, and, accordingly, what one can sensibly be
expected to contribute to the perfectionistic enterprise of culture varies
widely as well. Most, on Nietzsche’s view will be incapable of writing
masterful string trios. In this belief Nietzsche is deeply elitist. But
nonetheless he also thinks a higher form of life is open to the ordinary
person, and that is one in which they aid in the flourishing of intellectual
and artistic excellence – whether lugging the stones to build the cathedral or
even more indirectly, creating the material and (just as importantly) the
spiritual conditions that permit the leisured class the chance to participate
more directly in endeavors of the spirit. (Huddleston 2014, 142)
As already noted, Huddleston (like Church) mistakenly equates Nietzsche’s treatment of human
perfection with cultural flourishing, as evidenced in his comments immediately following the
quote above, in which he suggests that the “topic of the collective project of culture” was “one
that had been percolating since his [Nietzsche’s] early essay, ‘The Greek State,’ and it is one we
continue to see reverberate all the way through to his final works of 1888” (Huddleston 2014,
142). And there are other similarities between Huddleston’s account and Church’s. For, like
Church, Huddleston sees the contribution of the non-elite as chiefly material, in the sense that
their labor relieves the elite from the necessity of providing for his own material necessities. And
to the extent that Huddleston does refer to them in the quote immediately above, the spiritual
dividends he references there are cultural in nature. They are not the psychical benefits Nietzsche
consistently references throughout BGE. Huddleston helpfully provides illustrations of what he
regards as the material nature of this precondition. He refers, in an illustration quoted earlier, to
the individual who lugs the stones used to build a cathedral, and elsewhere to a slave building the
pyramids, and to some peon sweeping Beethoven’s floor.
None of these characterizations or illustrations, however, reflect the highly
spiritual, psychical character of the presupposition Nietzsche articulates in BGE. For, once more,
the sense in which Nietzsche takes human perfection to presuppose the subjugation of an
underclass must ultimately be understood in spiritual terms. He sees human perfection as the
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function of “the craving for an ever new widening of distances within the soul” (BGE 257). And
this craving is itself a function of a certain psychical state that he calls the pathos of distance.
Nietzsche describes this pathos as “the protracted and domineering fundamental total feeling on
the part of a higher ruling order in relation to a lower order” (GM I:2).
This particular description of the pathos of distance surfaces in the context of Nietzsche’s
account of the origin of the concept ‘good’. His account refutes a competing account put forward
by the English moralists. According to Nietzsche, these historians of morality claimed the
judgment ‘good’ originated from “those to whom ‘goodness’ was shown” (GM I:2). But
Nietzsche claims to the contrary that the concept ‘good’ arose out of the psychical state
experienced by the ruling class who “felt” their own persons and actions were good, particularly
in relation to their feelings about the persons and actions of the lowly.
But it is particularly the respective intensities of the feelings described in these competing
accounts on which I wish to focus our attention. One reason Nietzsche gives for rejecting the
opposing account for the origin of the concept of good is that the feeling a person gets when she
is the object of egoless acts is situational and fleeting. Such feelings lack the duration and
intensity required to account for the habitual association of the selfless act with the judgment that
the act was good. But the feeling the ruling class experienced when evaluating themselves and
their actions in relation to the lowly was, according to Nietzsche, protracted, forceful, and
essential. It was the intensity of this psychical state, which Nietzsche described as a wellspring of
total feeling, that emboldened the noble class to seize the prerogative to judge what was and was
not good. And what Nietzsche described as the “craving for still greater distances within the soul
itself” (BGE 257) was in effect the natural urge to further intensify this already rarified state of
mind. In effect, the higher type’s craving to close the distance between what he is and what he is
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ultimately capable of becoming is itself a function of the desire to widen the distance between
himself and the subjugated: “Without that pathos of distance which grows out of the ingrained
difference between strata […] that other, more mysterious pathos could not have grown up either
– the craving for an ever new widening of distances within the soul itself …” (BGE 257).
The high-stationed develop the craving for these higher and more comprehensive states
of human potential out of the pathos of distance, the psychological state that facilitates the
normalization of exploitation. And the normalization of exploitation is the practice of keeping
down, holding at a distance, constantly practicing obedience and command. It is patently
something that higher type does to the lower type, not something the lower type does for the
higher type. It wasn’t, then, a floor sweeper that Beethoven needed, as Huddleston suggests; he
needed a whipping-boy. It isn’t, in other words, the material advantage of not having to clean
one’s own abode that occasions the greatness of such individuals or that drives their selftranscendence, but the craving for greater growth, the pathos, that is itself a function of the
pathos of distance. This is not the prescription for modernity that Hitler’s national socialists took
it to be any more than it is a defense for wanton exploitation. It is a description of the underlying
principles or pathē involved in the “enhancement of the type ‘man.’” (BGE 257).
It is clear that the cultural theorists are concerned that when texts like this are taken at
face value, Nietzsche comes across as a promoter of needless exploitation. As I mentioned at the
outset, Huddleston refers to the ‘face value’ interpretation of texts like this as their “natural
reading,” and suggests that when Nietzsche is read in this way he appears to “praise a world in
which a small elite enhances itself through the subjugation of the rest of mankind, who bear this
yoke of servitude and get nothing in return” (Huddleston 2014, 135). Ironically, however,
Nietzsche is just as aware as the cultural theorists are of the immorality this formulation presents
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on its face. But Nietzsche’s approach to this apparent difficulty diverges sharply from the
cultural theorists’ approach to it.
The cultural theorists “redress” the apparent immorality of Nietzsche’s formulation by
recasting the role of the underclass as voluntary and self-sacrificial, and by excising from the
concept of Nietzsche’s elitism any notion of rapine. Their reading might roughly be summarized
as follows. Nietzsche advocates an aristocratic social structure in which the weak attain dignity,
value, and meaning by becoming the tools of exemplars, or by consecrating themselves to
culture. Church and Huddleston concur in this and conclude that the office formerly served by
literal slaves – that of providing the framework upon which higher types ascend – is just as
capably served by the weak and mediocre in general, but without the sacrifice of their rights or
self-ownership. The exploitation that Nietzsche styles ‘slavery,’ then, is slavery mostly by
analogy. It involves none of the heinous oppression and abuse that we might identify with, say,
the slavery of ancient Greece or Rome. It may be brutal, perilous and demeaning; it may even be
involuntary in some regards. But this would be the extreme lower limit of what a modern could
render to culture. And though it offends our sensibilities in some respects, it never sinks below
that point at which we may no longer conceive it to be a source of meaning and dignity for those
who submit to it.
Nietzsche too betrays, at times, concern about the seeming immorality of his formulation
of the project of human perfection. But his attempt to redress the apparent difficulty amounts to
no more than the few succinct rhetorical gestures he makes in an attempt to dismiss it. For
instance, after describing man’s ongoing project of self-transcendence as a function of
exploitative norms, he caps that passage (BGE 257) with the remark that the seemingly immoral
formulation he’d just used should be taken in a supra-moral sense. But he goes on to at least
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admit to a dilemma. The project he describes aims at the perfection of the species through a
process that involves behavior expressive of the life-drive. These modes of behavior include
“appropriation, injury, and the overpowering of what is alien” at one end of the spectrum and
exploitation at other. But while Nietzsche sees such behavior as supra-moral, in the sense that it
is conditioned by the amoral life-drive, he needs at the same time to acknowledge the obviously
libelous aspect of the language he’s confined to in characterizing it. His dilemma, in other words,
is this. While he acknowledges the fact that he describes man’s self-overcoming using “a moral
formula in a supra-moral sense,” he appears to have no answer to the question he seems to ask
himself: “why should one always use those words in which a slanderous intent has been
imprinted for ages” (BGE 259)?
4

CONCLUSION

The dilemma of Nietzsche’s moral formula of the preconditions of human perfection that
he wishes to be understood in a supra-moral sense brings us back to our opening remarks. The
reason why we must take his description of these preconditions in the radical sense in which they
are presented, rather than in the attenuated sense that Huddleston and Church suggest relates
back to the conceptual watershed defined by this dilemma. The thematic treatment of the
perfection of the species (as opposed to culture) necessitates a discussion of the more radical
theme of the life-drive, which is necessarily amoral, but leaves Nietzsche limited to the same
ethically infused vernacular he’d previously used to discuss the preconditions of cultural
progress. Additionally, Nietzsche clearly anticipated the interpretive missteps responsible for the
cultural reading, as evidenced by remarks that seemed designed to preempt it. He says, as
severally noted, not only that he intended that his formulations be taken in a supra-moral sense,
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but also in an exceptionally radical sense. If there is any lingering confusion perhaps it is owing
to the fact that Nietzsche appears to miss the beasts.
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